• if n = 1 then u(X) is a utility function for X in a onedimensional decision problem • if n > 1 then • u(X, Y ) is an n-attribute utility function;
• u(X, y i ) is a subutility function for X given a fixed value-assignment y i to attributes Y ; • u X (X) is a conditional utility function for X: a (possibly) re-scaled function u(X, y k ) for some -no longer explicit -y k .
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Different functional forms
Let X and Y be two attributes (generalisation to n > 2 attributes is straightforward). Consider the utility function u(X, Y ) for X and Y .
• u has an additive form if for constants
• u has a multilinear form if for constants k X , k Y , and k XY
• u has a multiplicative form if for constants k X , k Y , c X , and c Y
The constants are often called weights or scaling constants.
The different functional forms are only valid under certain assumptions; the values of the scaling constants are thereby often constrained!
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An example
The City of Utrecht decides to model the utility function u(Cost, Acres) as an additive function.
Using standard assessment techniques, they find for the conditional utility functions u C and u A that 
Interpreting weights or scaling constants
Reconsider the City of Utrecht's two attribute utility function u(C, A) = 3 · u C (C) + 1 · u A (A). Suppose that the City has explicitly expressed the indifference (50, 600) ∼ (60, 350), which indeed holds given all current functions:
u(50, 600) = 3 · u C (50) + u A (600) = 3 · 0.2 + 0 = 0.6 u(60, 350) = 3 · u C (60) + u A (350) = 3 · 0 + 0.6 = 0.6
Now, however, the City finds out that all alternatives result in at least a loss of 350 acres of land, and we rescale u C such that u C (350) = 1. The expressed indifference still holds, implying that u(60, 350) = k C · 0 + k A · 1 = u(50, 600) = k C · 0.2 + k A · 0
From this it follows that k C = 5 · k A .
Did C just turn from three times as important as A to five times as important? 
Assessing scaling constants (I)
Pricing out: Assess the marginal rate of substitution, that is, determine the value of one objective in terms of another.
Let X and Y be two attributes with values x 1 . . . x n , n ≥ 2, and y 1 . . . y m , m ≥ 2. Let e X and e Y be the units of measurement for the two attributes, respectively.
Suppose you are willing to sacrifice s units of Y for 1 unit of X. Then for all
If u(X, Y ) is additive and u X (X), u Y (Y ) are linear functions, then this implies that
As a result,
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Assessing scaling constants (II)
Swing weighting: Consider a set of n ≥ 2 attributes X 1 , . . . , X n . Swing weighting assigns weights to attributes based on either a rank-order or a rating on attributes and one consequence.
Take the (theoretically) worst possible consequence as benchmark. Then apply the following procedure:
rate(benchmark) ← 0 ; rank(benchmark) ← n + 1 ; for i = 1 to n do Z ← answer to:if you could swing one attribute from worst to best value, which would you swing?;
else rate(Z) ← answer ∈ 0, 100 .
Swing weighting -cntd
Consider a set of n ≥ 2 attributes X 1 , . . . , X n . Let rank(X i ) and rate(X i ) denote a ranking and a rating for attribute X i , respectively.
The weight w(X i ) for attribute X i can now be determined using either of the following two approaches:
Swing weighting -an example 
Assessing scaling constants (III)
Lottery weights:
Consider two attributes X and Y (the following extends straightforwardly to n > 2 attributes).
Let (x 0 , y 0 ) denote the worst possible consequence, and (x + , y + ) the best possible consequence.
The weight w(X) for attribute X equals p, where p is the indifference probability that follows from:
Lottery weights: an example
Assume once more that the City of Utrecht decides to model the utility function u(Cost, Acres) as an additive function:
The weight k C is assessed from:
The weight k A is assessed using: 
Additive independence -the formal definition
Use of an additive utility function is justified given the assumption of additive independence [AI] .
Two attributes X and Y are additive independent if preferences for lotteries over X × Y can be established by comparing the values one attribute at a time. More formally,
DEFINITION
Two attributes X and Y are additive independent if the paired preference comparison of any two lotteries, defined by two joint probability distributions on X × Y , depends only on their marginal distributions.
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Interpreting additive independence
The ability to establish preferences for lotteries over X × Y by comparing the values one attribute at a time entails the following:
• the decisionmaker should be indifferent between
since both have the same probability of achieving x 1 vs x 2 ;
• the decisionmaker should also be indifferent between
since both have the same probability of achieving y 1 vs y 2 ;
• this can only hold if p = 1 − p = 0.5
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Additive independence -a practical definition DEFINITION Consider two attributes X and Y with values x 1 , . . . , x n , n ≥ 2, and y 1 , . . . , y m , m ≥ 2.
X and Y are additive independent iff for an arbitrary pair (x j , y l ), we have for all pairs (x i , y k ) that 0.5 0.5
Note that additive independence is a symmetric property.
Additive independence -an example
Let u(X, Y ) be a two-attribute utility function defined as follows:
u(x 0 , y 0 ) = 1.0 u(x 0 , y 1 ) = 0.7 u(x 0 , y 2 ) = 0.5 u(x 1 , y 0 ) = 0.9 u(x 1 , y 1 ) = 0.6 u(x 1 , y 2 ) = 0.4 u(x 2 , y 0 ) = 0.5 u(x 2 , y 1 ) = 0.2 u(x 2 , y 2 ) = 0.0 X and Y are additive independent:
. . .
/ 401
Additive independence -the implication for u(X, Y ) Consider two attributes X and Y with values x 1 , . . . , x n , n ≥ 2, and y 1 , . . . , y m , m ≥ 2.
If X and Y are additive independent, then for any pair (x j , y l ), and all pairs (x i , y k ), we have by definition that
that is, the change in utility for values of one attribute is independent of the values of the other attribute:
This means that all subutility functions u(X, y k ) are the same, up to translation: u(X, y k ) = u(X, y l ) + c kl for some constant c kl .
Exploiting Additive independence
Consider two attributes X and Y with values x 1 , . . . , x n , n ≥ 2, and y 1 , . . . , y m , m ≥ 2.
If X and Y are additive independent, then three points u(x j , y l ), u(x j , y k ), and u(x i , y l ) serve for establishing a forth: u(x i , y k ) Y X u(X, Y ) can be constructed entirely from two intersecting subutility functions: 1. u(X, y k ) for some value y k of Y 2. u(x i , Y ) for some value x i of X
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Exploiting additive independence -an example
To establish u(C, A), the City of Utrecht assesses
• u(C, 600) for fixed acres: u(15, 600) = 0.75 u(50, 600) = 0.15 u(30, 600) = 0.35 u(60, 600) = 0.00
• and u(60, A) for fixed cost: u(60, 200) = 0.25 u(60, 400) = 0.15 u(60, 300) = 0.20 u(60, 600) = 0.00
These two functions intersect at u(60, 600) = 0.
Assuming additive independence, we have that for all c i and a j :
All other points can now be computed. The additive utility function -Ia THEOREM Let X and Y be two attributes with values x 1 . . . x n , n ≥ 2, and y 1 . . . y m , m ≥ 2. Attributes X and Y are additive independent iff the two-attribute utility function is additive:
where
constants, summing to 1.
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The additive utility function -IIa
LEMMA
Let X and Y be two attributes with values x 1 . . . x n , n ≥ 2, and y 1 . . . y m , m ≥ 2.
Attributes X and Y are additive independent iff the two-attribute utility function is additive:
where u(x 1 , y 1 ) = 0.
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The additive utility function -IIb Proof of Lemma: (⇒) Let x i and y k be arbitrary values of X resp. Y . Additive independence implies
, and let x j and y l be arbitrary values of X resp. Y . Then for all values x i and y k of X resp. Y , we have that
We conclude that X and Y are additive independent.
The additive utility function -Ib Proof of the Theorem: (⇒) From the previous lemma we have that for arbitrary values
(⇐) Analogous to proof of lemma.
Assessing the additive utility function -an example Suppose the City of Utrecht assesses the following conditional utilities for Cost and Acres lost:
For scaling constants k A and k C we know that k A = 1 − k C and that k C = u(15, 600). This latter utility is assessed using the following lottery:
The indifference probability k C is found to be 0.75. We therefore conclude that
Utility independence -the formal definition
Use of a multilinear or multiplicative utility function is justified under (mutual) utility independence [(M)UI].
Attribute X is utility independent of attribute Y if conditional preferences for lotteries over X given a fixed value for Y do not depend on the particular value for Y . More formally,
DEFINITION
An attribute X is utility independent of an attribute Y iff for any lotteries
] represents a conditional lottery over X × Y involving consequences over different values of X combined with a fixed value for Y .
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Interpreting utility independence Independence of conditional preferences for lotteries over X of the value of Y , entails the following:
since there is only a change in sure outcome of attribute Y (y 1 vs y 2 ), which should not affect preferences among lotteries over X;
• similarly, if (x C , y 1 ) is the certainty equivalent of the first lottery, then (x C , y 2 ) should be the certainty equivalent of the third lottery;
Note that the above means that also the preference order on values of X should be independent of the value of Y !
Utility independence -a practical definition DEFINITION Consider two attributes X and Y with values x 1 , . . . , x n , n ≥ 2, and y 1 , . . . , y m , m ≥ 2.
X is utility independent of Y iff for an arbitrary triple x i , x j , x k with x i x j x k , there exists a probability p such that for all values y l of Y , we have that
If X is utility independent of Y and Y is utility independent of X then X and Y are mutually utility independent.
Note: the above definition, in terms of a probability equivalent, can also be rephrased in terms of a certainty equivalent for a 50-50 lottery.
An example
Then we have:
• X is utility independent of Y :
• Y is not utility independent of X, as in the context of x 1 we have y 1 ≻ y 0 ≻ y 2 , and in the context of x 2 we have
Utility independence -the implication for u(X, Y )
First we observe that x 1 x j x n for each value x j of X. Now, if X is utility independent of Y , then we have by definition that for any x j there exists a p j such that for all y l ,
This means that all subutility functions u(X, y k ) are the same, up to (positive) scaling and translation:
u(X, y k ) = c kl · u(X, y l ) + d kl for some constants c kl > 0 and d kl .
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Utility independence -an equivalence
PROPOSITION
X is utility independent of Y , iff for each value y l of Y , there exist real functions g l > 0 and h l , such that
for all values of X and Y .
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Proof of the Proposition (sketch):
(⇒) First observe that for all x, x 1 x x n . Utility independence holds iff for each x a probability p exists such that
1 solve p from (I) with Y set to y l ; 2 substitute this result in (I) to get the desired result.
(⇐) Let g l > 0 and h l be such that for arbitrary y l :
Exploiting utility independence
If X is utility independent of Y , then one subutility function u(X, y k ) and two points u(x i , y l ), and u(x j , y l ) serve for establishing a second function: u(X, y l ) Y X u(X, Y ) can be constructed entirely from three subutility functions:
Three subutility functions THEOREM Let X and Y be two attributes with values x 1 . . . x n , n ≥ 2, and y 1 . . . y m , m ≥ 2.
If X is utility independent of Y then
where u(X, Y ) is normalised by u(x 1 , y 1 ) = 0 and u(x n , y 1 ) = 1.
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Three subutility functions
Proof of the Theorem (sketch):
Utility independence implies the existence of functions g > 0, h such that
1 set y l to y 1 ; 2 solve (I) for x 1 to get h 1 (Y ), using u(x 1 , y 1 ) = 0; 3 solve (I) for x n to get g 1 (Y ), using u(x n , y 1 ) = 1; 4 substitute these results in (I) to get the desired result.
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An Example
Suppose the City of Utrecht assesses the following utilities for Cost and Acres lost, given A fixed at 600, and C fixed at 15 and 60, respectively: Under the above conditions, we have that
where u(x 1 , y 1 ) = 0 and u(x n , y 1 ) = 1.
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The additive utility function -IIIb
Proof of the Corollary:
Utility independence implies that
with u(x 1 , y 1 ) = 0 and u(x n , y 1 ) = 1.
The lottery equivalence translates into
with u(x 1 , y 1 ) = 0 and u(x n , y 1 ) = 1
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The multilinear utility function -Ia COROLLARY Let X and Y be two attributes with values x 1 . . . x n , n ≥ 2, and y 1 . . . y m , m ≥ 2.
If X is utility independent of Y , then the two-attribute utility function is multilinear iff
for some constant b > 0.
Under the above conditions, we have that
The multilinear utility function -Ia
Proof of the Corollary:
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Exploiting mutual utility independence Consider two attributes X and Y with values x 1 , . . . , x n , n ≥ 2, and y 1 , . . . , y m , m ≥ 2.
If X and Y are mutually utility independent, then u(X, Y ) can be constructed from two subutility functions and one point: 1. u(X, y k ) for some value y k of Y 2. u(x i , Y ) for some value x i of X 3. u(x j , y l ) for some values x j = x i of X, and y l = y k of Y if X is utility independent of Y , but Y is utility dependent of X: • we first determine the function u(C, 300); • we then use u(C, 300) to derive all 'vertical' functions from u(60, A).
Example -continued (I)
The utilities assessed by the City of Utrecht: In addition, the utility u(30, 300) = 0.30 is assessed.
• we first determine the function u(C, 300): since C is UI of A, there exist functions g and h such that e.g.:
u(C, 300) = g 600 (300) · u(C, 600) + h 600 (300)
We require two equations to find g 600 (300) and h 600 (300):
u(30, 300) = 0.30 = g 600 (300) · u(30, 600) + h 600 (300) = g 600 (300) · 0.35 + h 600 (300) u(60, 300) = 0.20 = g 600 (300) · 0.00 + h 600 (300) resulting in u(C, 300) = 0.29 · u(C, 600) + 0.20
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Example -continued (II)
• we then use u(C, 300) to derive all 'vertical' functions from u(60, A): since A is UI of C, there exist functions f and k such that e.g.:
We require two equations to find f 60 (C) and k 60 (C):
Given that u(C, 300) and u(C, 600) are known functions, we can compute an f 60 (c i ) and k 60 (c i ) for each c i .
The multilinear utility function -IIa
THEOREM
Let X and Y be two attributes with values x 1 . . . x n , n ≥ 2, and y 1 . . . y m , m ≥ 2. If X and Y are mutually utility independent then the two-attribute utility function is multilinear:
is normalised by u(x 1 , y 1 ) = 0 and u(x n , y m ) = 1;
• u X (X) is a conditional utility function on X, normalised by u X (x 1 ) = 0 and u X (x n ) = 1;
scaling constants.
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The multilinear utility function -IIIa
LEMMA
If X and Y are mutually utility independent then the two-attribute utility function is multilinear:
is a scaling constant.
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The multilinear utility function -IIIb
Proof of Lemma: (sketch):
Mutual utility independence implies the existence of functions f > 0, g > 0, h, and k such that for arbitrary x l and y l
1 set y l to y 1 and x l to x 1 2 solve (I) for x 1 to get h 1 (Y ) and for x n to get g 1 (Y ) 3 solve (II) for y 1 to get k 1 (X) and for y m to get f 1 (X) 4 substitute these results in (I) and (II) → (I*) and (II*) 5 now solve (II*) for x n and fill in this result in (I*) to get the desired result.
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The multilinear utility function -IIb
Proof of the Theorem:
From the previous lemma we have that for arbitrary values x i and y j of X resp. Y , we have
Similarly, u(X, y 1 ) = k X · u X (X) with k X = u(x n , y 1 ).
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Assessing a multilinear utility function: example Suppose the City of Utrecht assesses the following conditional utilities for Cost and Acres lost: u C (15) = 1.0 u C (30) = 0.5 u C (50) = 0.2 u C (60) = 0.0 u A (200) = 1.0 u A (300) = 0.8 u A (400) = 0.5 u A (600) = 0.0
Constants k C = u(15, 600) and k A = u(60, 200) are assessed:
(60, 600)
The indifference probabilities found:
Interpreting scaling constants (I)
Let X and Y be two attributes such that Y ranges from 0 to 100 and u(X, Y ) = 0.25
Suppose that u(0, 10) = u(100, 0). 
Suppose we decide it is sufficient for Y to range from 0 to 10.
Then rescaling results in:
Did Y just turn from three times as important as X to equally important?
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Interpreting scaling constants (II)
Consider a multilinear utility function u(X, Y ) over attributes X and Y with values x 1 . . . x n , n ≥ 2, resp. y 1 . . . y m , m ≥ 2.
• k XY : consider two lotteries over values x i x j and y k y l : 0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
• k X , k Y : if you would rather 'swing' x 1 to x n than y 1 to y m , then k X > k Y , and vice-versa;
Even a mighty important attribute will have a small scaling constant if its range is relatively small!
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The multiplicative utility function THEOREM Let X and Y be two attributes with values x 1 . . . x n , n ≥ 2, and y 1 . . . y m , m ≥ 2. If X and Y are truly mutually utility independent then the two-attribute utility function is multiplicative:
where • u(x 1 , y 1 ) = 1, (x n , y 1 ) > 1 and u(x 1 , y m ) > 1;
constant.
The multiplicative utility function
Proof of the Theorem:
Mutual utility independence implies that u(X, Y ) is multilinear:
where • u(x 1 , y 1 ) = 0, u(x n , y 1 ) > 0 and u(x 1 , y m ) > 0;
where u * (x 1 , y 1 ) = 1, u * (x n , y 1 ) > 1 and u * (x 1 , y m ) > 1.
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The additive utility function -IVa COROLLARY Let X and Y be two attributes with values x 1 , . . . , x n , n ≥ 2, and y 1 , . . . , y m , m ≥ 2.
If X and Y are mutually utility independent then the two-attribute utility function is additive if
for some values x i , y k for which
where u(x 1 , y 1 ) = 0, u(x n , y 1 ) > 0 and u(x 1 , y m ) > 0.
The additive utility function -IVb
Proof of the Corollary (sketch):
Given mutual utility independence, we have that
Let x i , y k be values such that
Under this constraint, we find from the multilinear form that
Since u(x i , y 1 ) = u(x 1 , y 1 ) and u(x 1 , y k ) = u(x 1 , y 1 ), k must be zero.
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An example
Let X and Y be two attributes with values x 0 , x 1 , x 2 and y 0 , y 1 , y 2 . Let u(X, Y ) be a two-attribute utility function defined as follows:
u(x 0 , y 0 ) = 1.0 u(x 0 , y 1 ) = 0.9 u(x 0 , y 2 ) = 0.5 u(x 1 , y 0 ) = 0.8 u(x 1 , y 1 ) = 0.7 u(x 1 , y 2 ) = 0.3 u(x 2 , y 0 ) = 0.5 u(x 2 , y 1 ) = 0.4 u(x 2 , y 2 ) = 0.0 X and Y are mutually utility independent and for x 0 and y 0 we have An attribute X is preferentially independent of an attribute Y iff for any consequences (x i , y k ) and (x j , y k ) over X × Y with Y fixed to y k , we have
If X is preferentially independent of Y and Y is preferentially independent of X then X and Y are mutually preferential independent [(M)PI].
/ 401
Preferential independence -example Let X and Y have values x 0 , x 1 , x 2 and y 0 , y 1 , y 2 . Assume the two-attribute utility function is defined as:
• X is preferentially independent of Y :
x 0 x 1 x 2 for each value of Y ; • Y is not preferentially independent of X:
Validating preferential independence
Let X and Y be two attributes with values x 1 , . . . , x n , n ≥ 2, and y 1 , . . . , y m , m ≥ 2.
Use the following procedure to verify whether X is preferentially independent of Y :
1 choose some consequence (x j , y 1 ); 2 ask the decision maker for a value x i for which (x i , y 1 ) ∼ (x j , y 1 ) for some value x j of X and y 1 of Y ;
UI implies PI
PROPOSITION
If X is utility independent of Y then X is preferentially independent of Y .
Proof: Consider x i , x j and y k such that (
UI now implies the existence of functions g > 0 and h such that for arbitrary y l :
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PI implies UI ?
If X is preferentially independent of Y then X not necessarily utility independent of Y .
Counter example:
Consider the following utility function:
• we have no X UI Y :
holds for p ≈ 0.71 if y ≡ y 0 , and for p = 0, if y ≡ y 1 .
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Validating utility independence If X PI Y , then X is also utility independent of Y if in the following procedure x C is equivalent for all values of Y :
1 choose a lottery [0.5, P ; 0.5, Q] where P = (x 1 , y) and Q = (x n , y) for some value y of Y and values x 1 and x n of X; 2 ask the decision maker whether or not he prefers the lottery [0.5, P ; 0.5, Q] to a consequence (x i , y) for some x i , x 1 x i x n ; 3 repeat step 2 until you converge to the certainty equivalent (x C , y) of the lottery;
Repeat the procedure for different pairs of values for X.
AI implies (M)UI
PROPOSITION
If X and Y are additive independent then X and Y are mutually utility independent Proof (sketch): We prove X UI Y ; Y UI X is analogous.
AI implies u(X, y k ) = u(X, y 1 ) + u(x 1 , y k ) for arbitrary y k , where u(x 1 , y k ) is constant w.r.t the value of X.
Continuity implies, for arbitrary x i , x j and x k with (x i , y 1 ) (x j , y 1 ) (x k , y 1 ), that ∃p such that
Substitution of each u(X, y 1 ) in (I) with u(X,
MUI implies AI ?
If X and Y are mutually utility independent then X and Y are not necessarily additive independent.
Counter argument:
We have seen that an additional assumption is necessary to conclude additive independence given mutual utility independence (see Additive utility function IVa).
The mentioned corollary can be used to validate AI given MUI; another option is to assume that AI holds. . .
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Validating additive independence -example Suppose k C is assessed using the following lottery: resulting in k C = 0.75. As a consistency check, k A is assessed as well: 
Utility functions with one utility independent attribute
Let X and Y be two attributes. Suppose that X is utility independent of Y , but the reverse does not hold.
Recall that the two-attribute utility function can be specified using three subutility functions:
Other options are: replacing one or two subutility functions with one or two, respectively, isopreference curves.
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Isopreference curves -definition
An isopreference curve describes a set of consequences that are equally desirable to the decision maker.
DEFINITION
Consider two (sets of) attributes X and Y and a partial function i : X → Y such that for arbitrary values x i = x k of X and y j , y l of Y , we have that i(x i ) = y j and i(x k ) = y l ⇐⇒ (x i , y j ) ∼ (x k , y l )
An isopreference curve is an interpolant ı Y (X) of i(X).
Note that for any two points (x i , y j ) and (x k , y l ) on the isopreference curve, we thus have that u(x i , y j ) = u(x k , y l ) = c for some constant c.
As a result, u(X, ı Y (X)) = c is a constant subutility function, defined on all values of X. 
An example
Suppose the City of Utrecht assesses the following utilities for Cost and Acres lost: u(5, 600) = 1.00 u(50, 600) = 0.10 u(12, 600) = 0.70 u(60, 600) = 0.00 u(15, 600) = 0.75 u(75, 600) = −0.10 u(30, 600) = 0.50
In addition, the City indicates the indifferences 
